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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Patrick Segundo Oar appeals from his conviction for grand theft by 
extortion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Oar was in the Ada County Jail for a parole violation in April of 2014, and 
happened to be housed with Cecilio Ponce–Alba.  (Tr., p. 332, Ls. 5-14; p. 336, 
L. 6-12; p. 542, L. 24 – p. 543, L. 9.)1  Ponce-Alba—also known as “Omar”—was 
a drug trafficker distributing drugs from Mexico to California and Idaho who had 
recently been arrested for methamphetamine trafficking.  (Tr., p. 332, Ls. 9-14; p. 
345, Ls. 9-15.)  Omar was arrested after an associate of his helped police as a 
confidential informant and testified against him.2  (Tr., p. 352, L. 9 – p. 353, 
L. 16; p. 718. Ls. 15-20; p. 719, Ls. 11-13.) 
 At the time Oar and Omar were housed together the confidential 
informant owed Omar $4,000 for drugs Omar had previously given her.  (Tr., 
p. 718, L. 15 – p. 719, L. 7.)  Oar learned about this debt, and requested the 
assistance of Kathryn Blake in collecting it, allegedly on Omar’s behalf.  (PSI, 
p. 3; p. 892, Ls. 7-25; p. 894, L. 23 – p. 895, L. 8.) 
 Oar provided a letter to Blake to deliver to the confidential informant.  (Tr. 
p. 899, L. 25 – p. 900, L. 16; State’s Exhibit 11.)  The letter stated it was written 
                                            
1 Adopting the convention of Oar’s brief, this brief’s citations to transcripts will 
refer to the single volume comprised of trial and sentencing hearing transcripts. 
 
2 The transcript refers to the confidential informant as “M.D.” 
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by Omar, contained details about Omar that the confidential informant knew, and 
instructed the informant to pay the debt that she owed.  (Tr., p. 764, L. 10 – p. 
765, L. 19; State’s Exhibit 11.)  It also stated that “my [friends] in California are 
really mad so I don’t want you guys to get in [trouble],” and threatened that “if I 
sell the debt they will [probably double] the price with bad interest if not pay on 
time.”  (State’s Exhibit 11.)  Blake approached the confidential informant late at 
night at her work, stated she was there on behalf of Omar, and delivered the 
threatening letter.  (Tr., p. 720, L. 21 – p. 726, L. 16.) 
 Based on Oar’s threat3 the confidential informant—who stated she was 
“terrified”—agreed to pay her debt and meet with Blake again.  (Tr., p. 723, Ls. 1-
8; p. 779, L. 7 – p. 780, L. 1.)  But before she did, she contacted law 
enforcement, who provided her with marked currency and directed her to transfer 
the money while recording the conversation with a wire.  (Tr., p. 465, L. 5 – p. 
473, L. 17; p. 730, L. 25 – p. 732, L. 17.)  The confidential informant gave the 
money to Blake who was then arrested.  (PSI, p. 3.) 
 Oar was indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit grand theft by 
extortion and one count of grand theft by extortion.  (R., pp. 9-12.)  The state 
also filed an Information Part II against Oar charging a persistent violator 
enhancement.  (R., p. 29-30.)  After a joint trial with co-conspirator Blake, Oar 
                                            
3 Oar concedes on appeal that “there was sufficient evidence to support the 
jury’s finding that Mr. Oar (with the assistance of Ms. Blake) threatened [the 
victim] with future violence if she did not deliver money….”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 
7.)  For ease of reference this brief will thus refer to the threatening letter 
supplied by Oar, delivered by Oar’s accomplice at Oar’s instruction, as “Oar’s 
threat.” 
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was found guilty on both counts and admitted the enhancement.  (Tr., p. 1173, L. 
25 – p. 1174, L. 4; p. 1175, L. 10 – p. 1176, L. 24.) 
 The district court imposed concurrent 17-year unified sentences on both 
counts, fixing five years.  (Tr., p. 1218, Ls. 18-25.)  Oar timely appealed. 
(R., pp. 251-254.) 
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ISSUES 
 
Oar states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Should this Court vacate Mr. Oar’s conviction for grand theft by extortion 
as there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive 
sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Oar failed to show that there was insufficient evidence to support his 
conviction for grand theft by extortion? 
 
2. Has Oar failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing 
him? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Oar Has Failed To Show That There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support His 
Conviction For Grand Theft By Extortion 
 
A. Introduction 
 On appeal, Oar argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
jury’s finding that he was guilty of grand theft by extortion.  He argues that “the 
undisputed evidence in this case demonstrates conclusively that it was Detective 
Bruner who compelled, induced, or caused M.D. to deliver the money”—and not 
Oar.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 5-8.)  This argument fails, as there was ample 
evidence that Oar’s wrongful threat compelled or induced M.D. to deliver the 
money.  Consequently, Oar fails to show that there was insufficient evidence to 
support his conviction for grand theft by extortion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope.”  State 
v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 365, 283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 2011).  Idaho’s 
appellate courts will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury 
verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992).  In conducting this review 
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.  Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 
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955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. 
App. 1991).  Furthermore, the facts and inferences to be drawn from those facts 
are construed “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.”  Miller, 131 Idaho 
at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 
(Ct. App. 1987).  
 
C. There Was Sufficient Evidence That Oar Wrongfully Compelled The 
Victim To Deliver Funds, And Therefore, Sufficient Evidence To Support 
Oar’s Conviction For Grand Theft By Extortion 
 
 Idaho Code § 18-2403(1) sets forth that “[a] person steals property and 
commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate 
the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds 
such property from an owner thereof.”  In particular, “[a] person obtains property 
by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property 
to himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the 
property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: 1. Cause physical injury to 
some person in the future . . . .”  I.C. § 18-2403(2)(e). 
 No Idaho case directly addresses the issue that Oar raises on appeal—
that is, whether a threat is extortionate when it precedes a police-assisted 
delivery of funds.  Oar disagrees and cites State v. Reinoehl, which appears to 
contain a similar fact pattern as this case.  70 Idaho 361, 363, 218 P.2d 865, 
865-66 (1949), reh’g granted (1950).  But Oar overstates his case when he 
contends that the Reinoehl Court “[held] that, under the then-existing statutory 
scheme, attempted extortion occurs where a victim delivers property to another 
based upon a motivation other than the threat made by the defendant.”  
  7 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7, n. 5.)  The Reinoehl Court did not make such a specific 
holding, and in fact limited its opinion on rehearing to addressing “only one” of 
the “numerous alleged errors” in that case.  Reinoehl, 70 Idaho at 365, 218 P.2d 
at 867.  The Reinoehl court only addressed the defendant’s jurisdictional 
argument that he was “charged with attempted extortion by verbal threats as 
defined by [the then-existing extortion statute], and should have been tried in the 
probate court for which reason the probate court had no jurisdiction to hold him 
for trial in the district court.”  Id.  The court held that because the extortion statute 
existing at the time explicitly provided a misdemeanor penalty for attempted 
extortion, the general attempt provisions were not applicable, and therefore the 
standard misdemeanor punishment provision would apply instead.  Id. at 365-67, 
218 P.2d at 867-68. 
Thus, while the Reinoehl Court considered a case with similar facts, it 
ruled on a wholly separate legal question of whether the general attempt statute 
or the attempt statute specific to extortion applied to the charge.  Unlike Oar, 
Reinoehl was charged with attempted extortion. The Reinoehl Court did not 
consider whether that attempt charge was more or less appropriate than a 
completed offense charge, nor did it opine on the elements of extortion, and it 
did not hold that “attempted extortion occurs where a victim delivers property to 
another based upon a motivation other than the threat made by the defendant.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7, n. 5.)  Because Reinoehl was limited to the question of 
what statute applied to the crime charged, it does not control the issue in this 
case. 
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However, other jurisdictions with similar extortion statutes have addressed 
the issue of police-assisted delivery of funds in this context.  For example, in 
State v. Marsh, the Court of Appeals of Oregon examined an extortion statute 
nearly identical to Idaho’s: 
ORS 164.075(1) provides: “A person commits theft by extortion 
when he compels or induces another person to deliver property to 
himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, 
if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will in the 
future: (a) Cause physical injury to some person . . . .” 
 
603 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Or. App. 1979).  There, the Marsh Court considered an 
appellant’s argument that the district court erred by denying his motion for a 
directed verdict, because “there was no evidence that the manager of the drug 
store was motivated by fear in turning the money over to [the defendant’s 
accomplice.]”  Id.  The defendant contended “because the police were called and 
the money was given to [the defendant’s accomplice] at the police officer’s 
direction the most he can be guilty of is attempted theft by extortion.”  Id.  The 
court disagreed, holding that: 
The jury was instructed on the elements of theft by extortion and on 
the lesser included offense of attempted theft by extortion. 
Defendant did not assign the giving of these instructions as error. 
Assuming that the subjective state of mind of the victim is an 
element of the offense it was a factual determination for the jury as 
to whether he was in part motivated by fear of an explosion in 
giving the money to [the defendant’s accomplice]. The jury could 
infer that the store manager called the police and ultimately 
surrendered the money because of a concern that there was 
actually a bomb in the store which would be detonated if the money 
was not delivered. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that the 
participation of the police in marking the money and directing the 
manager to give it to Merrill was only an attempted theft. The 
motion for directed verdict of acquittal was properly denied. 
 
Id. at 1215. 
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 The Supreme Court of Utah reached a similar conclusion in State v. 
Prince after examining the then-existing extortion statute: 
“Extortion is the obtaining of property from another with his 
consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color 
of official right.” Section 8321, so far as applicable here, reads: 
“Fear, such as will constitute extortion, may be induced by a threat, 
either: 1. To do an unlawful injury to the person ….” 
 
284 P. 108, 109 (Utah 1930).  In that case, the defendant contended “the 
evidence conclusively shows [the victim], in paying the money, was not actuated 
by either force or fear, but by another and different motive, that of entrapping the 
defendant at the suggestion of the county attorney.”  Id.  The court disagreed 
and noted the evidence that the victim there was “actuated by fear” based on the 
defendant’s extortionate threats, which the court considered a “controlling factor 
in the payment of the money, notwithstanding [the victim’s] conversations with 
the officers and their activity in his behalf.”  Id. at 110.  The Prince Court further 
found that law enforcement did nothing to “entice or encourage” the crime, the 
defendant “was at all times the moving party,” and the victim was so afraid that 
he lost sleep and made complaints to law enforcement.  Id.  Accordingly, the 
Prince Court concluded: 
From the whole record we are unable to say that the evidence 
conclusively shows that the fear which [the victim] admittedly 
suffered before he visited the sheriff had been so overcome and 
dissipated that when the money was paid he was no longer 
actuated or controlled primarily by fear induced by threats. On the 
other hand, we think the jury could well have found, as they did, 
that fear induced by threats was the controlling factor. [The victim] 
said he was afraid when he went to Stella’s house, and the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the transaction bear out his 
statement that he was still in fear. The defendant had done all that 
he could toward the accomplishment of the crime of extortion. His 
unlawful intent was manifest. The threats to kill had been made, 
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not once, but several times. He demanded the money on the day it 
was paid, and when paid accepted it and put it in his pocket. So far 
as defendant knew, the extortion was complete. His wicked 
purpose was accomplished. There was sufficient evidence to show 
that fear induced by threats was the controlling factor in the 
payment of the money. 
 
Id. 
 Based on the evidence presented at trial the jury found Oar guilty of grand 
theft by extortion.  (Tr., p. 1174, Ls. 1-4.)4  The jury did so correctly because 
substantial evidence supported the elements of grand theft by extortion.  The 
                                            
4 And Oar assured the district court that he would not be “overtly arguing” that 
police intervention showed the extortion was not completed but only attempted: 
 
THE COURT: I’m concerned and I think [the attempt jury 
instruction] needs to be back in for this very reason: Either you 
argue or the jury on their own says, well, the instruction says the 
defendant did so by creating a fear in M.D., well, she didn’t turn the 
money over because she had this fear, she turned the money over 
because it was part of this sting. But if she originally had the fear 
and the only thing that keeps her from turning it over is the cops 
are involved and if the jury wants to otherwise acquit her because 
of that break in the connection, it seems to me that they could still 
find them guilty of attempted extortion. 
 
So I would be inclined to put it back in for that reason, not so much 
because it was somebody else’s money, I think it’s clear it doesn’t 
have to be her money, but I’m concerned about this connection that 
seems to be implicit in the statute that turning over the money is 
because of the fear instilled and the potential the jury might say 
well, she didn’t turn it over because she was afraid she turned it 
over because she was working with law enforcement at this point. 
 
[OAR’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: I guess I don’t have a strong feeling, I 
suppose, against that if the state is going to ask for it. It’s not going 
to be obviously—I can see how what I’ve just said might imply that 
sort of defense but it’s certainly not something I would be overtly 
arguing. 
 
(Tr., p. 936, L. 14 – p. 937, L. 15.) 
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plain text of Idaho’s extortion statute does not require the state prove any 
particular mental state or subjective motivation on the part of the extorted victim; 
rather, the state was simply required to prove that the fear-instilling threat 
compelled or induced the victim to turn over money to Oar’s accomplice. 
I.C. § 18-2403.   
The victim here testified that she received the threatening letter from Oar’s 
accomplice who stated she “was there on behalf of Omar.”  (Tr., p. 721, Ls. 14-
17; p. 722, Ls. 18-22.)  Before reading the letter the victim informed the 
accomplice that a payment plan would not be necessary because she would be 
paying the full amount.  (Tr., p. 723, Ls. 1-8.)  After reading the letter, the victim 
testified that she was terrified and called Detective Bruner right away. 
(Tr., p. 779, L. 3 – p. 780, L. 1.)  The victim stated that she called the detective 
for a couple of reasons: “it seemed a little bit threatening, intimidating, and also I 
didn’t have the money and I just needed to talk to him about it.”  (Tr., p. 728, 1-
6.)  Thereafter, Detective Bruner provided funds to the victim which she gave to 
Oar’s accomplice.  (Tr., p. 465, L. 5 – p. 473, L. 17; p. 730, L. 25 – p. 732, L. 17.)  
All told, there is substantial evidence that the payment was compelled or induced 
by Oar’s threat, because it was the reason the victim agreed to pay the debt, 
sought out assistance in paying the debt, and paid it. 
 Moreover, even if the state was required to adduce evidence of the 
victim’s motivation, it did so.  If this Court were to, in the words of the Marsh 
Court, “assum[e] that the subjective state of mind of the victim is an element of 
the offense,” it would find substantial evidence of the victim’s mental state and 
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motivation in the record.  Marsh, 603 P.2d at 1215.  The victim testified that upon 
contacting Oar’s accomplice she was anxious and nervous because she “did 
owe [Omar] money and I did assist law enforcement to set him up.”  (Tr., p. 721, 
L. 24 – p. 722, L. 5.)  When asked why she agreed to pay the full amount she 
testified she “wasn’t sure if anyone really was aware of my involvement in Omar 
getting arrested and was trying to keep it that way.”  (Tr., p. 724, Ls. 2-12.)  The 
victim testified that she had concerns for her physical wellbeing and safety, that 
the letter appeared threatening and terrified her, and that when Oar’s accomplice 
approached her, her “biggest fear just walked through the door.”  (Tr., p. 727, 
L. 25 – p. 728, L. 16; p. 776, L. 24 – p. 777, L. 6; p. 779, L. 3 – p. 780, L. 1.)  
Lastly, when reflecting on the contents of the letter, the victim testified she 
recalled Omar’s connections with “people he worked with in Southern California 
and Mexico” and with respect to drug debtors, Omar’s remark “you know they cut 
your head off or something”—the victim testified that she had “that kind of image 
in my head.”  (Tr., p. 777, L. 13 – p. 778, L. 1.) 
 Thus, much like the victims in Marsh and Prince, there was substantial 
evidence here that the victim agreed to pay her debt due to the fear instilled in 
her by the threat.  And there is substantial evidence that Oar’s threat was the 
“actuating motivation” for the victim to contact the police and ultimately give the 
money to Oar’s accomplice.  Based on the record there is no reason to think that 
without the threat the victim would have reached out to law enforcement on a 
whim to organize a sting operation, or voluntarily contacted the person whom she 
testified against in order to catch up on drug debt arrears.  Consequently, even 
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assuming the victim’s state of mind is an element of the crime, the jury had 
substantial evidence that the victim was afraid of the threat, primarily motivated 
by it, and delivered the funds to Oar’s accomplice as a result. 
Oar argues that “Detective Bruner compelled, induced, or caused M.D. to 
deliver the money to Ms. Blake, not Mr. Oar” and concludes that “[a]s such, there 
was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Mr. Oar was guilty of 
grand theft by extortion.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)  But this conclusion fails 
because there is no evidence that the victim was afraid of the detective, 
threatened by the detective, harmed by the detective, physically forced to 
participate in the payment, or even told by the detective that she “would receive 
consideration or a benefit for making contact with him” about the threat. 
(Tr., p. 729, Ls. 5-19.)  At most, the detective “directed” the victim to make the 
payment to Oar’s accomplice—or in other words, he asked her to.  (See 
Appellant’s brief, p. 7; Tr., p. 468, L. 25 – p. 469, L. 3; p. 469, Ls. 14-16; p. 663, 
Ls. 1-7, 20-22; p. 698, L. 5 – p. 699, L. 2; p. 730, Ls. 3-6.)   
Oar’s argument runs aground here, because if a detective’s request that 
the victim pay funds equates to compulsion, then Oar’s request that she pay 
funds is at least equally compulsive.  And, of course, Oar’s request came with 
additional incentives: it arrived as a collection letter promising “bad interest” in 
the event of late payment, allegedly penned by a man involved in international 
drug trade, whom the victim had recently testified against, and to whom the 
victim owed thousands of dollars, and whose salient stories regarding drug debts 
involved decapitated debtors.  (State’s Ex. 11; Tr. p. 345, Ls. 8-15; p. 373, L. 19 
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– p. 374, L. 23; p. 718, L. 15 – p. 719, L. 5; p. 719, Ls. 11-13; p. 777, L. 13 – p. 
778, L. 1.)  Accepting Oar’s premise that Detective Bruner “compelled” the victim 
with non-threatening requests or directions can only lead to the conclusion that 
she was likewise compelled by Oar’s threatening request—but by significantly 
greater degree. 
Oar’s argument therefore fails because even if he has successfully 
identified some evidence of law enforcement compulsion, or evidence that the 
victim had mixed motivations, Oar has not shown an absence of evidence that 
the victim was primarily compelled by Oar’s threat.  Here, regardless of law 
enforcement’s involvement, there is substantial evidence that the victim agreed 
to pay, contacted the detective, and participated in the payment in the first place 
because of the threat.  Thus, Oar’s claim the jury verdict is not supported by the 
evidence fails. 
II. 
Oar Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Sentencing Him 
 
A. Introduction 
 Oar argues that “in light of the mitigating factors that are present in this 
case” the district court imposed an excessive sentence.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-
10.)  This argument fails, as the district court considered Oar’s history, the facts 
of this case, and any mitigating factors, and imposed a sentence that was 
appropriate.  Oar has accordingly failed to show that the district court abused its 
discretion in sentencing him. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
 
The imposition of a particular sentence is within the discretion of the trial 
court.  State v. Arambula, 97 Idaho 627, 630, 550 P.2d 130, 133 (1976). 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Sentencing Oar 
 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to 
establish that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 
Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 
831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  Oar must therefore show that his sentence is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 
P.3d at 615.  A sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary goal 
of protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, 
rehabilitation, or retribution.  State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 
710 (Ct. App. 1982) (citing State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 
(1978)).  In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a 
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.  Toohill, 103 Idaho at 
568, 650 P.2d at 710. 
Here, the district court’s sentence was reasonable under any view of the 
facts.  The court began sentencing Oar by explicitly citing the Toohill factors.  
(Tr., p. 1215, Ls. 14-21.)  It noted that it had considered “the nature of the 
offense and the character of the offender, as well as the information in mitigation 
and in aggravation.”  (Tr., p. 1215, Ls. 15-17.)  The district court found that Oar 
put the victim and his co-defendant in danger, and it noted Oar’s “lack of honesty 
and sense of taking responsibility for conduct in this case.”  (Tr., p. 1216, Ls. 9-
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14.)  And the district court found that Oar’s conduct here was “consistent” with 
his prior “primarily predatory” history as outlined by this Court in State v. Oar.  
(Tr., p. 1215, L. 25 – p. 1215, L. 16.)  This Court recited Oar’s history as follows: 
Second, the district court considered Oar’s character. The district 
court was particularly concerned with Oar’s “ego and tremendous 
arrogance.” It seemed to the district court that Oar had potential, 
but believed that he could “con everyone” and that Oar’s history 
showed that he had “a willingness to take advantage of others and 
in addition to put others in danger.” The Court noted that the 
defendant had never “fully and honestly take[n] responsibility for his 
conduct” and had been dishonest with the district court. 
 
The district court also reviewed each of the four goals of 
sentencing. When considering protection of society, the district 
court stated that Oar’s history and actions in this case showed he 
would use his intelligence to take advantage of others. When 
considering deterrence, the district court stated that it was 
concerned that Oar must realize that his predatory conduct would 
result in jail time. When considering rehabilitation, the district court 
stated that although Oar showed potential, he failed to take 
advantage of “several efforts for him to be rehabilitated including a 
withheld judgment in 1980, probation in 1986, 1990, and 1993, and 
a retained jurisdiction in 1991.” Finally, when considering 
retribution, the district court found Oar’s conduct reprehensible, 
especially because he had not taken responsibility for it. 
 
State v. Oar, 129 Idaho 337, 343, 924 P.2d 599, 605 (1996) (holding that Oar’s 
sentence for two counts of sexual battery of a minor child was reasonable in light 
of the Toohill factors).  Lastly, the district court here noted that this crime was 
committed while Oar was in custody; “he was still reaching out to cause harm to 
the community” and trying to hatch an extortion scheme, potentially placing 
others in danger, despite efforts to protect the community by incarcerating him.  
(Tr., p. 1217, Ls. 2-7; p. 1217, L. 18 – p. 1218, L. 7.) 
 The district court considered all of this, and “all the mitigating factors,” but 
still concluded that “in light of the need to protect society, as well as the need for 
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retribution and punishment, because this was the latest in a number of offenses,” 
a significant penalty was warranted.  (Tr., p. 1217, Ls. 8-18; p. 1218, Ls. 8-17.)  It 
accordingly sentenced Oar to an aggregate term of 17 years, with 5 years fixed, 
on both counts.  (Tr., p. 1218, Ls. 18-25.)  In light of Oar’s history, the facts of 
this case, and the relevant sentencing factors, this was entirely reasonable. 
 Oar’s burden is to show that the district court’s sentence was 
unreasonable.  He has not done so.  Oar cites his admission he made a terrible 
decision, and claims to take full responsibility for his actions.  (PSI, p. 4; 
Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)  He also points to his family’s and community members’ 
letters of support.  (PSI, pp. 84-91; Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)  But the district court 
indicated that it reviewed the PSI, which includes the letters, and considered all 
the mitigating factors in crafting its sentence.  (Tr., p. 1215, Ls. 14-25; p. 1217, 
Ls. 14-18.)  The district court concluded that even in light of mitigating factors a 
significant penalty was warranted.  Given the facts and Oar’s history this was a 
reasonable exercise of discretion, and Oar has not shown otherwise.  He 
therefore fails to establish that the district court erred in sentencing him. 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
 DATED this 26th day of July, 2016. 
 
       
 /s/ Kale D. Gans___________________ 
 KALE D. GANS 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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